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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRINCE-COVEY & COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JERRY V. STRAND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 
12964 
This is an action by Plaintiff-
Respondent on a contract for the sale 
of securities to Defendant-Appellant. 
Plaintiff-Respondent is a licensed 
broker-dealer, engaging in the securi-
ties business through the regular and 
customary channels of interstate com-
merce. As such broker-dealer, Plaintiff-
Respondent both bought and sold various 
2 
securities for the account of the Defend-
ant-Appellant. Under the contract in 
question, Plaintiff-Respondent extended 
credit to Defendant-Appellant, for which 
payment was not made. Defendant-Appellant 
counterclaimed against Plaintiff-Respond-
ent for the conversion of various securi-
ties which Plaintiff-Respondent sold from 
Defendant-Appellant's account, without 
consent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a non-jury trial on the merits, 
the trial court granted Plaintiff judgment 
in the amount of $34,696.16. The lower 
court found that Defendant owed the Plain-
tiff $100,702.84. Further, that Plaintiff 
realized $63,267.00 from the liquidation 
of Defendant's account, resulting in a 
net amount due on the account by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff in the amount 
3 
of $37,435.84. Also, the lower court 
found that Plaintiff sold securities 
owned by Defendant from his account 
' 
without the consent of the Defendant. 
It was found that the fair market 
value of the converted stock within 
a reasonable period of time after date 
of conversion, less the amounts real-
ized from the sale of such stock, re-
sulted in damage to the Defendant in 
the amount of $6,430.00. This amount 
was offset against the amount found 
to be due from Defendant to Plaintiff, 
resulting in a judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiff in the amount of $34,696.16, 
which amount includes interest computed 
at the rate of six per cent (6%) per 
annum. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judg-
ment granted Plaintiff. If the Appellate 
4 
Court reverses Plaintiff's Judgment, Defend-
ant seeks judgment for $20,137.60. If 
the Appellate Court allows Plaintiff relief 
' 
then Defendant seeks review of the evidence 
and an order of this Court fixing Plaintiff's 
damages at $13,501.08, to be determined 
by the conversion measure of damages, 
and judgment on Defendant's counterclaim 
for $20,147.60. Offsetting those amounts, 
judgment should be granted Defendant for 
$6,636.52. If.the Appellate Court affirms 
the trial court on the relief granted Plain-
tiff, Defendant seeks a review of the 
evidence supporting the counterclaim and 
seeks amendment of the counterclaim judg-
ment to Plaintiff, after appropriate offsets, 
of $31,614.40. Also Defendant seeks an ' 
award of attorney's fees and costs of 
the appeal. 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, a Utah Corporation, is 
a licensed broker-dealer which buys and 
sells securities through interstate com-
merce (R. 135-36). Sometime in late 
1969, Defendant opened a special cash 
account with Plaintiff (Ex. 1-P & R. 136), 
which account was perhaps the bi:ggest 
account of Plaintiff (R. 138). Defendant 
placed orders with Plaintiff for the 
purchase and sale of various stocks and 
Plaintiff executed such orders until 
May 18, 1970 (Exs. 1-P & 2-D, and R. 136, 
201 & 239). 
Plaintiff treated Defendant's account 
as a COD account from about April 10 or 
11, 1970 (R. 143-45). There was no writ-
ten agreement of such COD account with 
Defendant (R. 143), there was no customer 
information card indicating a COD account 
(R. 152), the terms of such COD account 
6 
were never communicated to Defendant 
(R. 156-57, 178-91, & 214-15). De-
fendant's stock was placed in a single 
folder (R. 223), COD confirmations were 
handled like any other confirmations 
(R. 225), and such COD confirmations 
had no special notation that a COD 
transaction was involved (R. 227
1
-28). 
Approximately May 19, 1970, Plain-
tiff received a check of Defendant in 
the amount of $16,000.00, which was 
returned by the bank (R. 199). Plain-
tiff immediately commenced to liquidate 
Defendant's account by selling all of 
his stock, which included large blocks 
of stock in Classic Mining Corporation 
and Investestate (Ex. 3-P, R. 145 & 239). 
At the conclusion of the liquidation, 
which took approximately one month 
(Exs. 2-D & 3-P and R. 145), Defend-
ant's account had a debit balance of 
7 
$40,542.58 (Ex. 1-P & R. 203), which amount 
included cornmiss ion charges of the liqui-
dation (Ex. 2-D), resulting in a net debit 
balance in Defendant's account of $37,435.84 
(R. 78). 
Defendant owned certain stocks which 
were sold through the liquidation by 
Plaintiff, without consent of Defendant 
(R. 190 & 234). Defendant owned 27,500 
shares of Classic Mining Corporation, 
700 shares of Agau Mines, 30,000 shares 
of Investestate, 4,000 shares of Stans-
bury, and 2,000 shares of King Oil. 
The fair market value of said stocks 
within two weeks from the corrunencement 
of the liquidation was $17,980.00 (Ex. 
7-P & R. 235). Plaintiff realized 
$9 l 62 00 from the sale of said stock, , ~ . 
which was credited to Defendant's 
account, resulting in a net loss to 
the Defendant of $8,518.00 (Ex. 7-P & 
8 
R. 263-64). Allowable interest thereon 
to May 11, 1972, is $993.76, thereby 
entitling Defendant to judgment on 
his counterclaim in the amount of 
$9,511. 76. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUSTAtN ITS 
BURDEN OF PROVING AN AGREEMENT, OR ANY 
BREACH THEREOF, AS ALLEDGED IN ITS COM-
PLAINT. 
Defendant had an account with Plain-
tiff (R. 53 & 136). Plaintiff introduced 
no written agreement defining the kind 
of account it had with Defendant, and 
the testimony established there was 
none (R. 150-51). 
Keith Sudbury, a trader-broker agent 
for Plaintiff, testified that he assumed 
Defendant's account "was a special ac-
count payable within seven days, as all 
the rest of them were." Yet he did not 
know what kind of account was involved, 
9 
since it had been set up before he went 
to work for Plaintiff (R. 137 & 153). 
There was no testimony from the two 
principals of Plaintiff, or from any-
body, as to what kind of account was 
established for Defendant. There was 
no evidence of when such account was 
opened, no evidence of who set up the 
account, and no evidence of what, if 
any, terms of such account might have 
been, i.e., prices, quantities, deliv-
ery dates, limitations and restrictions 
on credit, if any, payment dates, wheth-
er the account was corporate, individual, 
joint tenancy, trust account, custodial 
account, or what parties, if more than 
one, were authorized to transact business 
~ connection therewith. 
On April 10 or 11, 1970 (R. 144), 
Plaintiff supposedly opened a COD 
account for Defendant, yet there was 
10 
no written agreement regarding such 
COD account (R. 143). Federal security 
law does not grant authority to create 
a COD account. No such account properly 
exists. Under Regulation T, Federal 
Reserve System, 12 C.F.R., Section 220.4 
(c)(S), which was promulgated under Sec-
tion 7(c) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C., Section 78g(c), as 
amended July 29, 1968, P.L. 90-437, 82 
STAT. 452, a broker-dealer may vary from 
the usual seven business days to thirty-
five calendar days to obtain payment 
from a customer. Section 220.4 of the 
Federal Reserve System Regulations 
covers the subject of special accounts, 
with sub-paragraph (5) permitting the 
broker thirty-five calendar days, rather 
than the usual seven business days, in 
which it must collect from a customer on 
a given transaction (R. 94-97) · 
11 
Specifically, the Regulation requires 
(1) the broker to act in good faith, (2) 
the broker and the customer to have an 
understanding when the broker purchases 
a security for the customer under this 
provision, (3) that delivery of the se-
curities must be promptly made to customer, 
(4) that full cash payment must be prompt-
ly made by customer against such delivery, 
and (5) that such special accounts must 
be recorded seperately and must be con-
fined to transactions and to relations 
~ecifically authorized. 
The foregoing provision of the 
Regulations was intended for use by 
institutional accounts, or for special 
situations where usual means of trans-
mittal make impossible the physical 
delivery of a given stock within a 
matter of two or three days. The test-
imony of Plaintiff indicated that a 
12 
COD account was created for Defendant 
(R. 143), and Mr. David E. Nelson a 
' 
certified public accountant, an officer 
and director of Plaintiff, and one of 
its principals treated Mr. Strand's 
account as a COD account, notwithstanding 
the clear and unmistakable limitation of 
the Regulation restricting the COD col-
lection period of thirty-five days to 
individual transactions (R. 198-99). 
Defendant's account was Keith 
Sudbury's biggest account, and was 
perhaps the biggest account of Plain-
1 tiff (R. 138). According to Mr. Sudbury, 
"Mr. Strand' s account produced in excess 
of $20,000.00 in gross commissions ... 
in a period of about five months" (R. 139). 
In fact commissions on the Strand ac-
' 
count from January 1, 1970 to May 18, 1970 
amounted to $27,133.29 (Exs. 1-P & 2-D). 
13 
Not only was it a large account (R. 138), 
producing substantial and profitable 
commissions (R. 139), but Defendant had 
always paid promptly (R. 143). 
According to David E. Nelson, who 
was "responsible for all of the account-
ing functions of the firm, which includes 
cashiering" (R. 198), Plaintiff received 
1 a bad check from Defendant on May 19, 
1 1970, which was returned from the bank 
(R. 199). Plaintiff demonstrated its 
good faith by immediately commencing 
liquidation of Defendant's account 
(Exs. 1-P, 2-D & R. 145). There was 
no testimony or other evidence that 
Plaintiff gave notice to Defendant, or 
that any reasonable, good faith effort 
was made by Plaintiff to effect recovery 
on the check. 
In addition, there was no testimony 
or evidence as to why Defendant delivered 
14 
a $16,000.00 check to Plaintiff, i.e., 
what stock was involved, if any, whether 
Plaintiff had delivered, or tendered 
delivery of any stock to tne Defendant 
' 
or his agent, and in fact, whether 
Plaintiff had received the appropriate 
stock so that it could have delivered 
• same to Defendant (R. 224). No confir-
: mat ion, or confirmations, of the trans-
action or transactions relating to the 
~16,000.00 were ever produced. In fact, 
what $16,000.00 check? None was ever 
offered in evidence by Plaintiff. 
· Clearly it can be seen that there was 
no evidence of what, if anything, De-
fendant might have owed Plaintiff at 
that time. 
Mr. David E. Nelson testified that 
there was a debit balance in the account 
on May 18, 1970 in the amount of $84, 607. 84 
15 
(R. 201), but there was no testimony or 
evidence that such amount, or any part 
thereof, was actually due from the De-
fendant to Plaintiff. Mr. Nelson conceded 
that had the check cleared, Defendant 
would still not "have been in violation," 
i.e., the account was current (R. 209). 
Not one single confirmation was produced 
as evidence of what was due. 
Plaintiff did not obtain Defendant's 
consent to liquidate. In fact, Defendant 
had requested Keith Sudbury not to liqui-
date the account (R. 168). There was no 
evidence that Defendant had pledged, 
hypothecated, agreed to indemnify, or 
in any way granted Plaintiff contractual 
authority to liquidate his account, or 
any single transaction pertaining to the 
account. Sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 
(c) of Section 220.4 of the Regulations 
16 
provides that if full cash payment is 
not made when due that the broker-dealer 
shall "promptly cancel or otherwise liqui-
date the transaction." (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 94-97). Thus, the applicable law 
grants authority to a broker-dealer to 
liquidate a transaction, not an account. 
David E. Nelson testified that "in some 
instances, the liquidation could have 
occurred prior to us [Prince-Covey] 
actually receiving the stock from the 
other side." (R. 224) On a COD 
transaction, payment is not due from 
the customer until delivery. Therefore, 
in those instances, the account clearly 
was not due. 
David E. Nelson also testified 
that the account was immediately charg-
ed for a purchase when Defendant placed 
his purchase order (R. 208). Plaintiff 
had charged $100,702.84 to Defendant (R. 202), 
17 
but there was no testimony or evidence 
that any stock had been delivered to 
Defendant. (See, Section 70A-8-313 
' 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) Accord-
ingly, it was impossible for the trial 
court to ascertain what, if anything, 
was in fact due from Defendant to Plain-
tiff thereby justifying the liquidation 
' of a single stock transaction, much less 
the whole account. 
At the time of the liquidation, 
Plaintiff's capital position or ratio 
was very "precarious." In fact, Plain-
tiff had to obtain more capital to satisfy 
their net capital requirements under the 
Regulations of the National Association 
of Securities Dealers, of which they 
Were a member (R. 192-97). Plain and 
simnle Plaintiff was in "bad trouble." 
' ' 
(R. 189) Plaintiff elected to save its 
18 
own hide by sacrificing the Defendant. 
Plaintiff well knew that Defendant had 
"a ton of stock" (R. 249) in his account, 
and that a total and immediate liquidation 
of the account would knock the bottom out 
of things . Mr. Almon M. Covey, who was 
a part-owner of Plaintiff and who was 
a registered securities broker, ~ndicated 
that the stocks which Defendant was deal-
ing in were "so speculative and the market 
dropped so fast that the equity declined 
so fast that it was virtually overnight, 
so our ratio wasn't completely adhered to 
because of those circumstances" (R. 187). 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Plain-
tiff nonetheless went ahead with a whole-
sale liquidation, appreciating that as 
a natural consequence of its actions, 
Defendant would be greatly and irreparably 
damaged. 
19 
Plaintiff as a licensed and register-
ed broker-dealer, engages in a highly 
sophisticated and regulated business. 
Such a business is at all times under 
the thumb and careful scrutiny of the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the Utah State 
Securities Commission, the Natiopal 
Association of Securities Dealers, 
and the local, regional and national 
stock exchanges. A broker-dealer, 
such as Plaintiff, handles millions 
of dollars of the general public's 
money through thousand of transactions. 
For a broker-dealer to manage such 
responsibility, it necessarily must 
have a highly refined accounting system, 
With the capacity to collate, organize, 
store and retrieve on relatively short 
~ice. 
20 
As a certified public accountant and 
' 
as a principal of Plaintiff, Mr. Nelson was 
certainly in a position to closely monitor 
and supervise the whole accounting func-
tion of the Plaintiff. Notwithstanding 
the fact that very substantial sums of 
money were involved in this litigation, 
with extremely important results: to 
the rights of both parties being in-
volved, David E. Nelson testified it 
was too much of a job to pull the con-
firmations (R. 224). 
Plaintiff's system was adequate 
enough to retrieve confirmations on 
both sides of a March 31, 1970 trans-
action wherein Defendant purchased 
2,000 shares Investestate (Ex. 4-P & 
5-P). It is patently apparent that 
Plaintiff could have provided confir-
mations on every transaction with the 
21 
Defendant, since such confirmations were 
filed by the Plaintiff in numerical sequence 
by transaction number (R. 244). Plaintiff's 
computer run on the account for the period 
in question contains a full list of the 
transaction numbers (Ex. 1-P). David E. 
Nelson admitted that he could pull all 
of the confirmations, if necessary (R. 224). 
It is respectfully submitted that 
it was necessary for Plaintiff to provide 
all of the confirmations in question. 
Sub-section (2) of paragraph (a) of Sec-
tion 220.4 of the Federal Reserve Regu-
lations requires that each special account 
must be recorded seperately. Plaintiff 
did not even pay lip service to such re-
quirement since it accounted for all 
transactions in account No. 01-182048-009 
(Exs. 1-P, 2-D & R. 203-4). This was 
done notwithstanding the distinct differ-
22 
ence between the usual special account 
seven day business credit period and 
the COD transactions with their thirty-
five calendar day credit period. Plain-
tiff co-mingled all of Defendant's stocks 
both owned by him and purchased by him 
on the special cash account, including 
COD transactions, in a single fiie 
(R. 224). Considering that all pur-
chases were posted to Defendant's 
account immediately (R. 208), and that 
liquidation could have occured prior to 
Plaintiff's actual receipt of stock 
from other brokerage firms (R. 224), 
thus making delivery impossible, 
there was no possible way for the trial 
court to determine the amount due with-
out written confirmations thereof. 
Not only was it impossible from 
the record to know what kind of account 
' 
23 
was involved, but it became apparent 
that there was some doubt as to whose 
account was involved. Keith Sudbury 
testified that some Agau stock was 
available for $6. 00, and he bought 
2,000 shares of said stock for some 
other parties and charged the $12,260.00 
purchase price to the Strand accpunt 
May 12, 1970 (R. 175-76). l 
1navid E. Nelson testified the 2,000 
shares of Agau were part of the Strand 
liquidation (R. 206). It is apparent 
from Exhibit 2-D that Plaintiff did not 
reverse (R. 206) the $12,260.00 debit 
from the Strand account until after the 
liquidation was completed. Note on 
Exhibit 2-D the debit balance of the 
Strand account of $44,545.38. Compare 
that with the adjusted debit balance 
~ Exhibit 3-P of $40,542.58. It readily 
can be seen that the large debit balance 
of Defendant's account on May 18, 1970, 
was greatly increased by Plaintiff's own 
shenanigans. Accordingly, Plaintiff's 
own debit balance figured in its decision 
to commence liquidation of Defendant's 
account. 
24 
POINT II 
PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES WAS NOT 
APPLIED BY TRIAL COURT TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Plaintiff's action is predicated 
upon the charge of $100,702.84 to De-
fendant's account before May 18, 1970 
(R. 202). Said charges were immediately 
. posted to Defendant's account when he 
placed a purchase order (R. 208). 
However, Defendant had no legal obliga-
tion to pay for the charges made until 
there was actual delivery of such stock 
(See, Section 70A-8-313, Utah Code 'An-
notated, 1953.), i.e., a COD transaction 
is one where the customer makes full cash 
payment for a stock against its delivery 
(R. 95; Section 220.4(c) (5), supra). 
Plaintiff only acquired right to 
payment when delivery was made to Defendant. 
Otherwise, Defendant owed Plaintiff nothing· 
25 
When the trial court entered judgment for 
Plaintiff, it could only have done so by 
finding at least a constructive delivery 
by Plaintiff to Defendant. Concluding, 
as the trial court must have done, either 
actual or constructive delivery of the 
stock to Defendant, it follows that 
Defendant was legal owner thereof. 
Plaintiff obtained no consent from 
Defendant to liquidate the account (R. 168). 
There was no evidence that Plaintiff had 
any contractual authority to liquidate 
the account. The applicable Regulation 
of the Federal Reserve Board grants a 
broker-dealer authority to liquidate a 
~ingle transaction. Plaintiff failed to 
prove a single transaction where delivery 
had been made and which had not been paid. 
There was no evidence that Plaintiff had 
any other authority in law to proceed 
26 
with liquidation. Such an unlawful 
deprivation by Plaintiff of Defendant's 
property, without legal justification 
therefor, was a conversion. Prosser, 
~w of Torts 66 (2d ed. 1955). The 
measure of damages rule applicable to 
conversion of securities is set forth 
in Western Securities Co. v. Silver 
King Consolidated Mining Co. of Utah, 
57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664, 672(Utah, 1920). 
Defendant is entitled to the fair market 
value of the stocks converted within a 
reasonable time after he received notice 
of the conversion. 
Paragraph 4 of the Counter-claim 
First Cause of Action lists the various 
stocks Defendant fully owned before May 18, 
1970, and which Plaintiff sold in its 
liquidation without Defendant's consent 
or authority (R. 64). Defendant testified 
27 
that the dollar amounts for each stock in 
Paragraph 4 were the fair market values 
of the stock within thirty days after the 
liquidation sale of such stock (R. 235 & 
243). Defendant's testimony was based 
upon actual sales transactions, or actual 
trades, within a two week period after 
. he first got notice of the liquidation 
(R. 243-44). 
Using the amounts of stock and fair 
market value prices set forth in Paragraph 4 
(R. 64), the fair market value unit prices 
are: Classic Mining, 34¢; Investestate, 
12¢; Stans bury, 8¢; Agau, $5. 50; King Oil, 
43¢. 
Using Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-P for 
purposes of illustration, it can be seen 
that the trial court's award of damages 
to Plaintiff was in error. First, the 
shares which were fully owned by Defendant 
28 
when the liquidation commenced (See, 
Exhibit 7-P.) should be subtracted 
from the stocks scheduled on Exhibit 
3-P. Accordingly, the schedule of 
Exhibit 3-P should include only 99,000 
shares of Classic Mining, 65, 000 shares 
of Inves testate, 7, 100 shares of Agau 
I and no King Oil. Second, those stocks 
in those amounts should be multiplied 
by the unit prices referred to above. 
Third, after making those adjustments, 
the Court must use the remaining amounts 
realized from liquidation on Exhibit 3-P, 
since the trial court had no other evi-
dence before it. Following this line of 
reasoning, Plaintiff should have received 
~85,541.50 from its liquidation. Sub-
tracting that amount from the $100, 702. 84 
which Plaintiff claimed Defendant owed on 
Hay 18 1970 the trial court should have 
' ' 
found Defendant owed $15, 161. 34, less com-
29 
missions charged on the liquidation in the 
amount of $3,106.74, 2 resulting in a net 
amount due from Defendant to Plaintiff in 
the amount of $12,054.60. If the Court 
concludes that Defendant owed Plaintiff 
anything, then that amount, plus interest 
at 6 percent per annum from May 19, 1970 
to May 11, 1972, in the amount of $1,446.48, 
or a total of $13,501.08, should be the 
amount awarded Plaintiff on its complaint. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF $6,430.00 
DAMAGE TO DEFENDANT ON ITS COUNTER-CLAIM IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
If this Court concludes Plaintiff did 
not prove an agreement, or a breach thereof, 
then Plaintiff is entitled to no damages. 
2The trial court adjusted the final 
amount awarded Plaintiff by the commiss-
ions charged by Plaintiff on the liguida-
tion. This can be derived by totaling 
the individual transaction commissions 
Which appear in Exhibits 1-P and 2-D. 
30 
Assuming that conclusion, Defendant would 
be entitled to judgment against the Plain-
tiff for $17,980.00,
3
plus interest at 6 
percent per annum from May 19, 1970 to 
May 11, 1972, in the amount of $2,157.60, 
~a total of $20,147.60 (R. 64 & 235). 
Assuming this Court finds there was 
a contract and a breach thereof, the Court 
should apply the fair market value measure 
of damages which is fully described in 
Point II, supra. Following this conclusion, 
the $12,054.60 damages to Plaintiff should 
be offset against the $20, 137. 60 damages 
to Defendant, resulting in a net judgment 
to Defendant on May 11, 1972 in the amount 
of $8,083.00. 
3Defendant testified the total damages 
were $16,980.00 (R. 235~, but t~er~ ~as an 
error in addition. Taking the individual 
figures pertaining to the stocks in question, 
the loss to Defendant was $17, 980. 00 (R. 64) · 
Mr. Prince recognized this mathematical 
error (R. 237). 
31 
Finding No. 19 of the trial court 
that Defendant was damaged in the amount 
of $6,430.00 is palpable error (R. 78). 
Defendant testified he had been damaged 
in the amount of $16,980.00 [sic.-
$17, 980. 00 ] (R. 78). The trial court 
concluded that $6,430.00 was the dif-
ference between the fair market value 
of the stocks which were fully owned by 
Defendant at the date liquidation com-
menced, and the amounts already realized 
through liquidation of such securities. 
The only evidence that the trial 
court had before it converted amounts 
realized fro~ the sale of Defendant's 
fully-owned stock is Exhibit 7-P. There 
is no other controverting evidenc.e about 
that point in the record. 
Accordingly, the trial court was 
comp2lled to find Plaintiff realized 
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$9,462.00 from the conversion of Defendant's 
stock. Deducting that amount from the 
conversion damages to Defendant in the 
amount of $17,980.00, the Court must 
find, as appears in Exhibit 7-P, that 
Defendant's conversion loss was $8.518.00. 
Allowable interest at 6 percent per annum 
from May 19, 1970 to May 11, 1972, is 
$993.76, making the total due Defendant 
$9,511.76 on May 11, 1972, the amount 
which the trial court should have awarded 
Defendant as an offset against anything 
~arded Plaintiff. 
POINT IV 
PAYMENT FOR THE SALE OF SECURITIES 
BY PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
Section 70A-8-319, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, sets forth the applicable statute of 
frauds concerning contracts for sale of 
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securities. Sub-paragraph (a) applies in 
cases where the party to be bound signs a 
writing. Plaintiff did not have the 
Defendant sign anything (R. 150). Sub-
paragraph (b) requires that delivery of 
a security (See, Section 70A-8-313, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953.) be accepted by 
the person to be bound. There was no 
evidence of delivery on a single trans-
action, or the acceptance thereof by 
the Defendant. Sub-paragraph (c) provides 
that the party against whom enforcement 
is sought must within a reasonable time 
after a sale or purchase receive a written 
confirmation of said transaction, and 
unless he sends the broker-dealer a written 
objection to the contents of such confir-
mation, he is bound by its contents. Not 
a single confirmation of a single trans-
action was introduced by Plaintiff, though 
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David E. Nelson testified that all of them 
could have been pulled (R. 224). Further, 
he testified that a confirmation was mail-
ed to a customer on every trade in the 
usual and ordinary course of business 
(R. 222). He did not testify that con-
firmations were mailed to Defendant, 
and no confirmations were produced on 
transactions of Defendant. There was 
no testimony that Defendant.received 
one confirmation. Sub-paragraph (d) 
provides that if the party sought to be 
bound "admits in his pleading, testimony 
or otherwise in court that a contract 
was made for a sale of a stated quantity ----
of described securities at a defined or 
stated price the statute of frauds 
requirement would be met. 11 There was 
no admission by Defendant in pleading, 
testimony, or otherwise, that (1) a 
contract was made, (2) that there was 
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a stated quantity on a given transaction 
(3) that the securities of such transaction 
were described, and (4) that there was a 
defined or stated price as to such security, 
or securities. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant acknowledges that he had 
an account with Plaintiff. There was 
some evidence that Defendant had a 
special cash account with Plaintiff. 
However, Plaintiff's evidence was that 
about April 10, 1970, Defendant's account 
was converted to a COD account. The 
federal law permits a broker-dealer 
to handle individual transactions on 
a COD basis, but compels strict ac-
counting for such transactions, separate 
recording of special accounts, specific 
authorization on transactions where there 
is an understanding between broker and 
customer, prompt delivery of the security 
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in question to the customer, and full 
cash payment for the security upon delivery. 
All of Plaintiff's evidence indicated 
there were no segregation of accounts 
and it was candidly admitted that both 
the usual special account transactions 
and the COD transactions were all handl-
ed in one account. All of Defendant's 
stock was kept in one folder, without 
segregation. There was no evidence 
about any understandings between the 
parties on any transaction, about 
delivery of stocks on any transaction, 
about cash payment from Defendant on 
any transaction, or about any other 
specific term or terms of an account 
or transaction agreement. 
One major difference between the 
usual special cash account transaction 
and the COD transaction is that a broker-
dealer has seven business days in which 
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to collect from a customer on the usual 
special cash account transaction, and 
thirty-five calendar days in which to 
collect from a customer on the COD 
transaction. Since Plaintiff saw fit 
to lump everything together in one 
account, without any specific segrega-
tion, it is impossible for the Court 
to determine what, if anything, Defend-
ant might have owed Plaintiff. 
It is respectfully submitted that 
Plaintiff, to avoid meeting Defendant's 
substantial and meritorius defense 
which had application to one kind of 
transaction but not the other, consciously 
changed its position. In so doing, it 
was unable to prove its case. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse 
the trial court on any relief granted 
Plaintiff and should modify the relief 
' 
granted on the counter-claim, awarding 
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Defendant the full relief sought in the 
counter-claim First Cause of Action. 
Costs and attorney's fees should be 
awarded Appellant-Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
466 East 5th South, 
Suite 101 , 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellant 
Received two copies of this APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF this~~-day of December, 1972. 
FREDERICK S. PRINCE, JR. 
Prince, Yeates, Ward, Miller 
and Geldzahler 
455 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
